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A procurement contract is granted by a bureaucrat (the auction-
eer) who is interested in a low price and a bribe from the provider.
The optimal bids and bribes are derived based on an iid private cost
assumption. In the experiment, bribes are negatively framed (between-
subjects treatment) to capture that society is better oﬀ if bribes are
rare or low. Although bids are lower than predicted, behavior is qual-
itatively in line with the linear equilibrium prediction. When bribes
generate a negative externality, there is a signiﬁcant increase in the
variability of the data.
Keywords: Corruption, Procurement Auctions
1 Introduction
Bureaucrats with discretionary power to select suppliers in procurement are
arguably prone to accept (or even require) bribes. In our theoretical model
as well as in the experiment we refrain from specifying how one negotiates
whether and which bribes are paid. Rather, we assume an institutional setup
in which both, lower oﬀers and larger bribes, are possible ways of increasing
the own chances of becoming the provider. One of our experimental treat-
ment does (not) impose a negative externality of bribing on all members of
society. Thus we address the question whether ethical considerations have
any eﬀect on bribing behavior.
One way to model corruption in procurement auctions is to focus on
the ex post collusion opportunities between a corrupt bureaucrat and one
1speciﬁc bidder, who is given the opportunity to re-submit his or her bid after
the bureaucrat has received all (initial) bids. This re-negotiation approach
is followed, for instance, by Comte et al. (2000) and more recently by
Lengwiler and Wolfstetter (2004).
In contrast, our setup reﬂects a situation where the bidders compete not
only in prices but also in bribes, where the auctioneer’s commonly known
behavioral rules reﬂect institutionalized corruption. Here, bribes are simul-
taneously oﬀered by all bidders along with their price oﬀers. Our approach
is similar to that Beck and Maher (1986) and Lien (1986), who established
the fundamental isomorphism between bribes and price-competition. How-
ever, whereas these early studies assume that bidders can compete either in
price or in bribe oﬀers only, we allow bids in both dimensions, as is the case
in Burguet and Che (2004).
More speciﬁcally, we study the behavior of the potential providers when
facing a corrupt bureacracy, and not how bureacrats solve the conﬂict be-
tween their moral duties and their desire for bribes since our theoretical and
experimental analysis assumes exogenous preferences of the bureacrat.1
In the following we introduce the game model and derive its linear equi-
librium (Section 2). We then describe the experimental procedure (Section
3) and analyze the experimental data (Section 4). Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Two a priori symmetric bidders compete for a public procurement contract
to provide an indivisible good. If the contract is granted to any of the
two bidders, there would be an increase of 1 + w0 (with w0 > 0) in social
welfare with respect to some status-quo level. Thus, if the ﬁnal price paid
to the supplier of the good is p, the social value of granting the procurement
contract is V (p) = 1 + w0 − p (without taking into account the winning
bidder’s proﬁt).
The bureaucrat, being society’s agent, is in charge of evaluating com-
peting bids and choosing the provider. Although the bureaucrat’s duty is
to maximize V (p), he also takes into account any bribes accompanying the
1While these preferences could be experimentally induced by an appropriate payoﬀ
function of subjects playing the role of the bureaucrat, we simply implement them as an
impersonal–and more or less corrupt–bureaucratic institution.
2price bids. In particular,2 denoting by b the bribe oﬀered along the price
bid p, the bureaucrat will select an oﬀer (p,b) over the alternative (p0,b0) if
U(p,b) > U(p0,b0), (1)
where U(p,b) = (θ + b)V (p) with θ > 0. Obviously the bureaucrat faces a
tradeoﬀ, since he is interested in both a low price and a high bribe.
The cost of both bidders, C and C0, are two iid random variables follow-
ing a Uniform [0,1] distribution. While the rules of the procurement auction
necessarily remain silent about the feasible levels of the bribe component of
a bid, b, they impose an upper bound p ≤ 1 + w0 on the price component.
Therefore bidders can only submit price bids p,p0 ∈ [0,p]. For the sake of
tractability, it is also assumed that θ ≥ (1+w0)−p, so that the bureaucrat’s
preferences do not diverge too much from his moral duties.
We only consider the lowest-bid=price rule, in which the winning bidder
receives the price speciﬁed in his own oﬀer. Thus, if a provider with actual
cost C submits an oﬀer (p,b) while his competitor’s oﬀer is equal to (p0,b0),
then the former earns
π = p − C − b, (2)
provided that (1) holds. The losing competitor, who oﬀered (p0,b0), is left
empty handed and earns 0 (i.e., oﬀered bribe is paid only by the provider).
Due to the symmetry of both suppliers we focus on the symmetric equi-
librium solution of the game that satisﬁes some obvious monotonicity prop-
erties. In particular, we restrict our analysis to linear solutions in the sense
of linear functions p(·) and b(·) of the cost level C for risk-neutral bidders.
Proposition 1 In the procurement contest with bribes there is a unique
symmetric and linear equilibrium (p∗(C),b∗(C)) such that p∗(C) − b∗(C)







2In the Appendix it is shown that nothing much changes if the behavior of the bureau-
cracy is in line with the more general criterion (θ +b)
γV (p)





more complex utility functions U(p,b) = (θ +b)
γV (p)
α of which (1) is the particular case









Proof. The problem of deciding how much to bid (the choice of 0 ≤
p ≤ p) and how much to oﬀer as a bribe (the choice of b ≥ 0) can be solved
in two steps: a supplier can ﬁrst identify the set of oﬀers that maximize his
acceptance probability by the bureaucracy, and then choose p and b from
this set so as to maximize his expected proﬁt. Let us start with the ﬁrst
problem: For given cost C, any winning oﬀer (p,b) with constant net revenue
p − b = k yields the same proﬁt π(C,k) = k − C. Maximizing acceptance
probability thus means to solve
max
p,b






2 , if k ∈ [0,1 + w0 − θ],







2 , if k ∈ [0,1 + w0 − θ],
k , if k ∈ [1 + w0 − θ,p].
(4)
Thus, what remains to be determined is the function k = k(C) which allows
to write p∗ and b∗ as functions p∗(C) and b∗(C). Notice that
U(p∗(k(C),b∗(k(C)) > U(p∗(k(C0),b∗(k(C0))
if and only if
k(C0) > k(C).
For a monotonic (and hence invertible) function k(·) with k0(·) > 0, we can
























The linear solution of this diﬀerential equation is
f(k) = 2k − 1.


















is the unique symmetric, linearly monotonic equilibrium.
Since p∗(C) − b∗(C) = 1
2, the two preference parameters θ and w0 of
the bureaucrat aﬀect the equilibrium choices b∗(C) and p∗(C), but not their
diﬀerence.
3 Experimental Design
The auction mechanism described above was implemented in a laboratory
experiment to compare the predicted price-bribe combinations against ac-
tual choice behavior.3 Participants played in pairs the auction game over 30
rounds, using either a partners protocol (sessions 1 and 4) or random match-
ing protocol (sessions 2 and 3). The partners protocol captures the idea that
often the same suppliers compete in successive procurement auctions. By
the strangers protocol we explore the case where, as in the theoretical anal-
ysis, no future interaction takes place. In case of the partners protocol,
3Rather than imposing rule (1) as a mechanism we could have invited and used actual
players in the role of the bureaucrat, who could have been paid according to U(p,b). This
shows that our design is open also for exploring how bureaucrats cope with the ethical
conﬂict between moral duties and own monetary incentives. Since in this study we want to
focus only on how potential providers react to a corrupt bureaucracy, we have implemented
(1) just as a mechanism, without employing real participants in the role of a bureaucrat.
5subjects played with the same partner ten periods, so that each participant
played with three diﬀerent partners during the whole session. In case of
the random matching protocol, pairs of participants were re-matched each
period within matching groups of size 6. There were 30 participants in each
session, except for session 4, which consisted of 24 participants only.
In the experiment, the random cost variable assigned to each participant
in each period was iid Uniform ∼ [0,100], and the maximum price was
set equal to p = 150 token. To prevent participants from making losses,
they were constrained to submit bids (p,b) such that p − C − b ≥ 0. The
parameters of the allocation function U(p,b) were set such that 1+w0 = 160
token and θ = 10 token. Thus, the benchmark bid functions are









for all C ∈ [0,100].
We used the exchange rate between tokens and Euro as a treatment vari-
able in order to implement the negative external eﬀects created by bribery.
Whereas sessions 1 and 2 relied on a ﬁxed exchange rate of 100 token = 2.50
Euro, sessions 3 and 4 implemented a variable exchange rate, which could
take on values of either 2.00 or 3.00 Euro per 100 token. In the latter case,
the payments of each matching group were calculated every 10 rounds in the
following way: The total amount of bribes oﬀered by all members of each
matching group during a block of 10 rounds was compared with the respec-
tive total amount oﬀered by a “reference” matching group. If the players in
the matching group in question oﬀered higher bribes than the players in its
reference group, then the former were paid 2.00 Euro for each 100 tokens
they had earned during the block of 10 rounds. If they oﬀered lower bribes
than the reference group, then they received 3.00 Euro for each 100 tokens
they earned during the block of 10 round. The reference matching group
used to do this comparison was randomly chosen (for each matching group)
every 10 periods among the remaining 4 groups in the session. The variable
exchange rate protocol is intended to capture institutional competition in
the sense that countries, regions, or industries facing less corrupt bureaucra-
cies will, for instance, be more attractive for investors in the long run, while
6Fixed Exchange Rate Variable Exchange Rate
Partners Strangers Partners Strangers
Min. 3.8 3.7 1.5 5.0
1st Qu. 6.6 7.7 6.1 7.9
Median 9.0 8.9 7.2 8.5
Mean 9.1 9.1 9.0 9.7
3rd Qu. 11.3 10.8 11.4 11.4
Max. 14.0 16.1 19.9 17.0
Table 1: Distribution of Euro proﬁts by session
those with corrupt institutions will suﬀer from a comparative disadvantage.
4 Results
The average payment in all treatments was between 9 and 10 Euro per person
(see Table 1). Figure 1 shows that the interquartile range in the distribution
of monetary payments among participants in the strangers protocol was
smaller than in the partners-matching for both ﬁxed and variable exchange
rate.













Figure 1: Distribution of Euro proﬁts by session
Observed bid behavior as a function of cost is illustrated in Figures 2 and
73 for the partners and strangers matching protocols, respectively. Although
variation in the data is quite substantial, the distribution of both the mean
price and bribe bid functions seems to be linear in C. The similarity with
other auction experiments is illustrated in Figure 4, which shows the distri-
bution of the net price, k(C) = p(C) − b(C), and that bid shading applies
also to net prices in the form of k∗(C) > k(C) > C. In Figures 2 to 4,
decisions made during the ﬁrst 10 rounds are plotted with a circle, whereas
decisions made in rounds 11 to 20 and 21 to 30 are plotted with a ‘+’ sign
and a ‘×’ sign, respectively. It can be seen that decisions made in initial
periods exhibit more variation than decisions made in the ﬁnal 10 periods,
suggesting learning eﬀects.






































































































Figure 2: Observed price and bribe bids under partners-matching protocol
Since price and bribe decisions are made simultaneously, one should ex-






































































































Figure 3: Observed price and bribe bids under strangers-matching protocol
pect them to be correlated. This is evidently the case, as shown in Figure
5, where the deviations between actual and equilibrium bids are plotted for
each treatment. Thus, estimating price and bribe bid functions of the form
p = φ0 + φ1C + εp
and
b = β0 + β1C + εb
cannot be done independently. Therefore, we analyze the data estimating
both functions simultaneously, under the assumption that the disturbance
vector ε = (εp,εb) follows a bivariate normal distribution with zero mean
































































































































The estimated coeﬃcients, obtained via maximum likelihood, are pre-
sented in Table 2. Using the likelihood ratio test, it is straghtforward to
test several hypothesis of interest within treatments. The ﬁrst two hypothe-
ses concern the variance structure of the data, namely, H0(1) : s2 = 1 and
H0(2) : ρ = 0. Thus, while the former postulates equal variability of the
prices and bribes bid, the latter implies that price bids are independent
of the oﬀered bribes. Also, the adequacy of the theoretical model can be

















Partners: Fixed Exchange Rate


















































Strangers: Fixed Exchange Rate


















































Partners: Variable Exchange Rate


















































Strangers: Variable Exchange Rate

































Figure 5: Deviation between actual and equilibrium bids
examined by looking at the following two hypothesis:












Using Bonferroni critical values (for testing multiple hypothesis), we ﬁnd
clear evidence indicating that the price and bribe decisions are positively
correlated and that the variance of the bribing behavior is smaller than that
of the pricing bids (i.e., H0(1) and H0(2) are rejected).
Also, hypothesis H0(3) is rejected for all treatments, conﬁrming that
behavior is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the theoretical prediction regarding
11Fixed Exchange Rate Variable Exchange Rate
Coeﬃcients Partners Strangers Partners Strangers
Price bid:
φ0 86.2319 85.4661 83.7707 85.5287
φ1 0.2938 0.3668 0.3388 0.3383
Bribe bid:
β0 44.0869 43.6383 39.0160 40.3708
β1 -0.2870 -0.2340 -0.2133 -0.2432
Variance matrix:
σ2 230.2144 218.3924 235.0101 244.1888
s2 0.6937 0.7967 0.6438 0.6164
ρ 0.5588 0.6079 0.4688 0.4224
log-likelihood -7037.3216 -7010.1230 -5757.4873 -7152.1265
AIC 14088.6432 14034.2460 11528.9746 14318.2530
Table 2: Maximum-likelihood estimates of bivariate bid function
the bivariate distribution of p and b. The less stringent hypothesis H0(4),
however, is not rejected neither in the partners nor in the strangers protocol
under variable exchange rate. This indicates that the equilibrium net price
prediction, p∗(C)−b∗(C) = 50− 1
2C, can only be rejected in case of a ﬁxed
exchange rate, i.e., if bribing externalities are absent.
Nevertheless, the statistical results concerning H0(4) must be taken cau-
tiously, since the variable exchange rate treatment may have triggered more
risk-aversion, which in turn could have increased the variance in behavior.
Indeed, if we look at diﬀerences between treatments, also using likelihood
ratio tests for multiple comparisons between samples, the estimates of the
variance matrix Σ do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer between partners and strangers
design (for any given an exchange rate treatment), although there is evi-
dence of an exchange rate eﬀect (holding the matching protocol ﬁxed). In
other words, failure to reject H0(4) in the variable exchange rate treatments
may be simply due to the larger variability of the data.
Finally, Table 3 shows the p-values from the likelihood ratio tests for
ﬁve pairwise comparisons of mean bribing behavior between treatments.
Only the comparisons where strangers matching and ﬁxed exchange rate
are involved show a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in mean bribing behavior. As
illustrated in Figure 6 (where the continuous straight line is the theoretical
prediction and the dashed line the maximum-likelihood estimate from Table
2), mean bribing behavior is slightly closer to the theoretical prediction in
12H0 : [β0,β1] is equal between treatments
Comparison p-value
SFix vs. PFix < 10−7
SVar vs. PVar 0.1304
SVar vs. SFix < 10−7
PVar vs. PFix 0.2887
SFix vs. PVar < 10−7
(Bonferroni 5% critical value is 10
−7)
Table 3: Likelihood ratio tests for pairwise comparisons of mean bribing
behavior between treatments.
case of a ﬁxed exchange rate under a strangers matching design, as compared
to all other treatments.
5 Conclusions
Assuming a corrupt bureaucracy via condition (1) and our speciﬁcation of
U(p,b), we have derived the equilibrium behavior of risk-neutral bidders, and
collected experimental evidence on actual pricing and bribing behavior by
competing bidders. As predicted, bribes are actively used, even when they
are framed negatively (in the variable exchange rate treatment). As had to
be expected for a highly stochastic setting with private cost information,
the eﬀect of the (partners versus strangers) matching protocol is minor.
The main implication of our ﬁndings is that, when being confronted
with a corrupt bureaucracy, people do not mind engaging in active bribery,
at least when there is no threat of (legal) punishment. A second implica-
tion is that being aware that corruption is detrimental for society does not
help much: It mainly increases heterogeneity in behavior due to idiosyn-
cratic reactions to such social eﬀects. In our 2×2 factorial design, only the
constellation of strangers matching and ﬁxed exchange rate seems to elicit
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in bribing behavior (Table 3).
Nothing in our design (and the benchmark solution) would prevent ac-
tual participants from playing the role of the bureaucracy; it would suﬃce to
pay them according to the evaluation function U(p,b), following the stan-
dard experimental practice in the induced-value tradition. Although this
would not aﬀect the validity of our benchmark solution, it would neverthe-





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6: Estimated bribing function
introduce additional moral constraints. For instance, bidders would have to
ask themselves whether it is appropriate to seduce the bureucrat, and the
bureaucrat would face a tradeoﬀ between an ethical and a ﬁnancial reward.
In the investigation presented here, therefore, the role of the bureacrat has
been excluded altogether, focusing the analysis on bidders’ behavior. The
laboratory results obtained in this restricted scenario lead us to conclude
that, whenever the existence of a clearly corrupt and anonymous bureau-
cracy is commonly known, bidders will engage in active bribing!
Appendix
Here we derive the solution for U(p,b) = (1+w0 −p)α(θ+b)γ with α,γ > 0
instead of (1) where α = 1 = γ.
14From the ﬁrst order conditions of the Lagrangian
L = U(p,b) − λ(p − b − k)
one obtains
p∗(k) =


































U(p∗(C),b∗(C)) > U(p∗(C0),b∗(C0)) ⇔ C < C0.










which is identical to what has been derived for the special case α = 1 = γ.
The function k∗(C) obviously satisﬁes k0(·) > 0 and therefore applies here,
too.
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